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ciently unequal" to warrant disregarding the analogous statute of limitations. Apparently, the court in the case at bar was motivated by several
equitable considerations, to wit: the age of the plaintiff-widow; her need
for the funds; the unjust enrichment enjoyed by the defendants; and the
position of power in the corporation occupied by the plaintiff's daughterin-law, who dominated the family finances, coupled with her apparent
abuse of this power in refusing to compensate the plaintiff. However, the
court failed to indicate which, if any, of these factors it considered
determinative in reaching its decision.
The impact of the decision in Tower is clear. The statute of limitations can no longer be considered as an absolute bar to an action merely
because of the passage of time. Where a legal action is barred by the
applicable statute of limitation, but might have been brought either in
law or in equity, the alert attorney can circumvent the bar of the statute
by stating an equitable cause of action, assuming that the equities are
''sufficiently unequal" to justify disregarding the statute of limitations.
STEPHEN

G.

FISCHER

ATTORNEY'S FEE EARNED PRIOR TO TESTIMONY
Plaintiff-attorney, upon learning that he would be required as a
material witness on behalf of his client, withdrew from the case, and
the remainder of the trial was conducted by defendant-attorney. At the
trial, portions of plaintiff's testimony supported his ex-client's contentions,
other portions did not, and much of his testimony was cumulative. Plaintiff sought recovery from defendant of the portion of the contingent fee
which the plaintiff had earned prior to his withdrawal from the case.
The trial court found that there had been an implied agreement between
plaintiff and defendant that each would share in the fee and that plaintiff,
prior to his withdrawal, had performed twenty percent of the total legal
services; but the court ruled that plaintiff was precluded by the Code
of Professional Responsibility from sharing in the contingent fee. The
District Court of Appeal, First District, affirmed on appeal.' The Supreme
Court of Florida, on conflict certiorari review, held, reversed: Absent
bad faith or coloring of testimony affecting the outcome of the litigation,
an attorney who withdraws from a case to become a material witness is
entitled to the reasonable fee which he earned prior to the time he realized
or should have realized the need for his testimony. Hill v. Douglass,
271 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
The ethical requirement that an attorney withdraw from the trial
of a case when he learns or reasonably should have learned that he will
1. Hill v. Douglass, 248 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
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be a material witness in the case is predicated upon the well-established
undesirability of one individual's acting in the dual capacity of advocate
and witness. 2 The general prohibition against this dual role was incorporated from former Canon 19S into the Code of Professional Responsibility4 as Ethical Considerations 5-9 and 5-101 and as Disciplinary Rules
5-101 and 5-102.' An attorney may not accept 7 or continue8 employment
if he learns or if it is obvious that he will be called as a witness on behalf
of his client, unless either (a) the testimony will relate solely to an un2. Over one hundred years ago, the ethical impropriety of the dual role was widely
recognized, as noted by the court in Morgan v. Roberts, 38 Ill. Rep. 65, 86 (1865):
This is a matter which appeals to the professional pride of an attorney, and his
sense of his true position and duty. In the English courts, in several cases, it was
held that an attorney cannot appear in the same cause in the double capacity of
witness and advocate, and it has been so ruled in Pennsylvania and in Iowa, on
the circuit. In Indiana it was held by Judge McDonald, now United States District
Judge, that an attorney in a cause could not be permitted to testify to the general
merits of the case. In Frear v. Drinker, 8 Penn. State Reports, 521, the court said
that it was a highly indecent practice for an attorney to cross-examine witnesses,
address the jury and give evidence himself to contradict the witness-that it was a
practice to be discountenanced by court and counsel-that it was sometimes indispensable that an attorney, to prevent injustice, should give evidence for his client.
It however leads to abuse, but at the same time there was no law to prevent it.
All the court can do is to discountenance the practice, and when the evidence is
indispensable, to recommend to the counsel to withdraw from the cause.
3. Appearance of Lawyer as Witness for his Client.-When a lawyer is a witness for
his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of
an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel.
Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in
court on behalf of his client.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 19.
4. The CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, adopted by the American Bar Association in
1908 and by Florida in 1941, were replaced by the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

consisting of Ethical Considerations, Disciplinary Rules, and renumbered and revised Canons.
The CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY became effective for American Bar Association

members on January 1, 1970 and was adopted by Florida effective October 1, 1970.
5. Ethical considerations [hereinafter cited as EC] are aspirational objectives toward
which members of the profession should strive. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Pre-

liminary Statement.
6. Disciplinary rules [hereinafter cited as DR] are mandatory. Id.
7. DR 5-101(B) provides:
A lawyer shall not accept employment in contemplated or pending litigation if he
knows or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness, except that he may undertake the employment and he or a lawyer in his firm
may testify:

(1) If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested matter.
(2) If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no
reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the
testimony.
(3) If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case by the lawyer or his firm to the client.
(4) As to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial hardship on the client
because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the
particular case.

8. DR 5-102(A) provides:
If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer
learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness
on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial and his firm,
if any, shall not continue representation in the trial, except that he may continue
the representation and he or a lawyer in his firm may testify in the circumstances
enumerated in DR 5-101(B)(1) through (4).
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contested matter, (b) the testimony will relate solely to a formal matter
and no substantial evidence is reasonably expected to be offered in opposition to the testimony, (c) the testimony will relate solely to the nature
and value of legal services rendered by the attorney or his firm to the
client, or (d) refusal to testify would work a substantial hardship on the
client.' However, he may accept and need not withdraw from employment
if it is unlikely that he will be called as a witness because, if he were
called, his testimony would be merely cumulative.' 0 Although there is no
express provision in the Code of Professional Responsibility which denies
a legal fee to an attorney who testifies on behalf of his client," an examination of the following reasons underlying the prohibition against the
dual advocate/witness role will demonstrate how the question of impropriety of a fee in such a case arises.
One who must argue his own credibility is in an unseemly and
ineffective position:
The roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the
function of an advocate is to advance or argue the cause of
another, while that of a witness is to state facts objectively.'
He is a less effective witness, because he renders himself more easily
impeachable for credibility. 13 Conversely, the opposing counsel may be
handicapped when attempting to attack the testifying attorney's credibility.' 4 The attorney's desire to serve his client, coupled with his position
as a witness for his client, might invite perjury.'5 Furthermore, the unseemly dual role may create a poor public image of the legal profession
and invoke embarrassing criticism, even if the attorney were actually
able to effectively disassociate his two roles:
Although his zeal as a lawyer might not influence his testimony
as a witness, an ever critical public is only too apt to place such
a construction upon it. A lawyer should avoid not only all improper relationships but should likewise, in order to maintain
the profession in public confidence and esteem, avoid all relationships which appear to be improper.'
Not only is the attorney who violates the rules subject to discipline,
but he may be precluded from testifying for his client. Florida courts
take the position that if an attorney who has not withdrawn from the
case attempts to testify on behalf of his client, and if such testimony
9. DR 5-101(B)(1)-(4) and DR 5-102(A).
10. EC 5-10.
11. 271 So.2d at 3.
12. EC 5-9.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. CoMA. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE FLA. BAR, OPINIONS, No. 67-30.
16. ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, OPINIONS, No. 50 (1931).
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would be contrary to the Code of Professional Responsibility, an objection by the opposing attorney on these grounds will exclude the testimony. 7
An attorney whose failure to withdraw from the case violates the
Code of Professional Responsibility is precluded from sharing in the
legal fee, under the reasoning that to award such a fee would be to condone the ethical breach.' 8 However, where there has been no ethical
violation, i.e., where the attorney meets one of the exceptions which
permit him to take or remain on the case, or where, as in the instant case,
the attorney has withdrawn, the question is more difficult of solution.
Although his role is ethical, he is nevertheless confronted with the considerations underlying the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In response to an inquiry as to whether an attorney would be permitted to testify concerning material matters on behalf of a client whose
case he was handling on a contingency basis, the Florida Bar Professional
Ethics Committee replied that if such testimony were necessary, the
attorney should withdraw from the case and not participate in any fees,
particularly where the fee is contingent. 19 Although the inquiry was not
directed to the question of compensation for work done prior to withdrawal, the committee noted that nonparticipation in fees might "create
some hardship in view of the work already done," indicating its belief
that a fee even for prior work would be impermissible. The main reason
for this holding is the possibility of misunderstanding by the public and
by the jury, with a consequent adverse effect on the client's case and on
the legal profession in general.
The Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee established a guideline for the testifying attorney whereby he may remain on the case if his
continued employment is essential to the ends of justice, as permitted
under the "substantial hardship" exception to the disciplinary rules. However, a contingent fee is impermissible in such circumstances, although
there has been no violation of the rules of ethical conduct.2 0
In another opinion, the Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee
stated that it would be improper for an attorney who referred a client to
17. Millican v. Hunter, 73 So.2d 58 (Fla. 1954); Dudley v. Wilson, 152 Fla. 752, 13
So.2d 145 (1943) ; In re Estate of Freeman, 240 So.2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) ; see Beavers
v. Conner, 258 So.2d 330 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). But cf. Pastorius v. Whidby, 76 Fla. 571, 80
So. 513 (1918). Florida's view is contrary to the weight of authority, which holds that
when an attorney's testimony violates rules of professional conduct, it is not thereby
rendered incompetent or inadmissible, although the attorney may be subject to disciplinary
proceedings and his credibility may be adversely affected. E.g., ABA CoMMs. ON PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, OPINIONS, No. 50 (1931); United States v. Fiorillo, 376 F.2d 180,
185 (2d Cir. 1967); Food Fair Stores, New Castle, Inc. v. Howard, 58 Del. 558, 212 A.2d
405 (1965); Swaringen v. Swanstrom, 67 Idaho 245, 248-49, 175 P.2d 692, 693-94 (1946), and
authorities cited therein. See also Morgan v. Roberts, 38 Ill. Rep. 65 (1865), supra note 1.
18. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 233 So.2d 150 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
19. COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF" THE FLA. BAR, OPINIONS, No. 65-40.
20. COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE FLA. BAR, OPINIONS, No. 67-30. Some support for this conclusion was found in PHILADELPHIA BAR ASS'N CoMM. ON PROFESSIONAL
GUmANCE, OPINIONS, No. 8 (1941), which stated that a contingent fee would be improper
where an attorney acted as witness and his partner acted as counsel.
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another attorney, and who later served as a witness in the litigation, to
share in the contingent fee .2 1 Although this opinion was based upon the
assumption that there had been no legal services performed for the client
by the attorney seeking the fee, and that the fee was therefore prohibited
by former Canon 34 as being merely a referral fee,22 the opinion notes
that former Canon 19 has been interpreted to preclude a testifying attor23
ney's participation in a contingent fee.
Opinions of the Professional Ethics Committees of the Florida
and American Bar Associations are persuasive authority in interpreting
the Code of Professional Responsibility, but are not binding upon the
courts. 24 Therefore, the Supreme Court of Florida in Hill v. Douglass

was able to examine the construction which had been given to the Code
of Professional Responsibility by the Florida committee in relation to
fees where the advocate/witness rule was involved, since there was no
25
express provision in the Code concerning this subject.
Although agreeing with the disallowance of a fee for services earned
after an attorney becomes a witness if his testimony and failure to
withdraw violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, 26 the court
in Hill v. Douglass considered the propriety of awarding a fee for services rendered prior to testimony where the testimony did not violate
the Code. The court weighed the negative effect of disallowing a fee
for services earned by the attorney prior to his becoming a witness
against the negative effect of allowing such a fee. Disallowance of such
a fee would be unjust since it would deprive the attorney, who has withdrawn from the trial of the case in accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility, of compensation which he had earned for services
previously performed. Such deprivation "should no more apply to an
attorney than to any other profession or trade. ' 27 Not only would disallowance be unfair to the attorney who would not be compensated for
his services, but it would result in unjust enrichment to the attorney
who replaced him and who would be compensated for the work of both
attorneys.2 '
Where more than one attorney is handling a case, the possibility
21. COMMs. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE FLA. BAR, OPINIONS, No. 68-19.
22. The subject matter of former CANON 34 is now covered by EC 2-22 and DR 2-107,

which prohibit a division of fees unless there has been a division of services.
23. See CoMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE FLA. BAR, OPINIONS, No. 67-30.
24. Hill v. Douglass, 248 So.2d 182, 183 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
25. Because of the absence of express provisions, the court stated: "It is therefore with
more justification that we examine into [sic] this interpolation than if there were an express
or clearer prohibition in the canon itself regarding a fee." 271 So.2d at 3.
26. 271 So.2d at 3-4.
27. Id. at 4. In Brass v. Reed, 64 So.2d 646, 648 (Fla. 1953), the court similarly failed
to find any distinction between an attorney's and a non-attorney's right to compensation
for services rendered, holding that an attorney is no more entitled to maintain a cause of
action in equity for his fees than is any other person for services rendered, or for labor,
supplies and materials.
28. 271 So.2d at 4.
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of such unjust enrichment to the nontestifying attorney might tempt
one of the attorneys to name the other as a witness, knowing that if
the other were to withdraw from the case, the entire fee would be
awarded to the attorney who called him. 29 That same possibility might
tempt an attorney whose failure to testify would work a substantial
hardship on his client to nevertheless refuse to testify. The attorney
would know that if he did testify, he would lose the right to compensation for services rendered prior to and after the need for his testimony
arose. It might also encourage the "devious division of dividends" to
avoid the harshness of such a rule." °
The only negative effects which might result from allowing the
prior earned fee and which would be alleviated by disallowing it, are
the possibility of perjury by the attorney/witness in order to increase
his fee and the possibility of giving an appearance to the public that
his testimony might be affected by his having performed prior services
for the client. The possibility of perjury is greatly diminished by the
court-established requirement that for allowance of the fee there must
be neither bad faith nor coloring of testimony affecting the outcome of
the litigation. As to the second possibility, the public image of the legal
profession is unlikely to be adversely affected by permitting the attorney
to recover the fruits of his labor:
Denial of a prior earned fee is unduly stretching the possibility
that an attorney's later testimony would be viewed as affected
by the fact that he had done earlier work in the case for which
he should be rightfully paid."
Thus, the negative effects of disallowing the fee greatly outweigh any
possibility of perjury or of an adverse effect on the attorney's public
image, and the testifying attorney is entitled to his prior earned fee.
The amount of the fee to be allowed was held in Hill v. Douglass
to be the reasonable value of the testifying attorney's services performed prior to the time he knew or should have known of the need
for his testimony. However, what was in issue was the right of the
plaintiff-attorney to a portion of the fee, and not the amount thereof.
Having determined that the correct measure of the fee was the reasonable value of plaintiff's services, the Supreme Court of Florida accepted
the trial court's determination of the amount of that reasonable value.
The portion of the total contingent fee awarded the plaintiff was equal
to that portion of the total services performed which the plaintiff's services prior to his testimony comprised. Since plaintiff had performed
twenty percent of the total services, the reasonable value of his services
was found to be twenty percent of the total contingent fee. 2
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. at 5.

31. Id. at 4.
32. The total contingent fee was stated by the trial court as $58,892.97 in one portion of

1972]

CASES NOTED

It is submitted that although the method of computing the amount
of plaintiff's fee was not in issue, it was correctly determined in the
instant case. The amount of the total contingent fee had already been
established, and once it was determined that both plaintiff-attorney and
defendant-attorney were entitled to some portion thereof, the reasonable
value of either attorney's services was correctly measured as the portion of that contingent fee equal to the portion of the total services
which that attorney performed. Although as a general rule the reasonable value of an attorney's services is not determined by the amount
agreed upon as a contingent fee, this rule has been applied in cases
setting the reasonable value of attorney's fees to be paid by a party
who had no opportunity to participate in setting the contingent fee," a
rather than, as in Hill, where an established contingent fee amount is
sought to be divided between two attorneys.
In Security Trust Co. v. Grant,84 an attorney filed the plaintiff's
complaint, which included a statement that plaintiff had agreed to pay
his attorney a reasonable fee for his services if judgment were entered
in favor of plaintiff. Eight months later, before the answer was filed,
the original attorney withdrew from the case for a reason not disclosed
in the record, and new counsel appeared for plaintiff. During the trial,
the original attorney testified for plaintiff as to matters within the Dead
Man's Statute, which statute would bar the testimony of a person "interested in the event."8 Defendant contended that the testifying attorney was entitled to a fee under the contingent fee alleged in the
complaint, for the proportionate part of the work he had performed
prior to his withdrawal, and that he was therefore barred by the Dead
Man's Statute from testifying. However, the court held that the attorney
was not a person "interested in the event" because there was nothing
to show that his compensation for prior services would be on a contingency basis. The rationale for this holding was that there existed no
its opinion and as $56,892.97 in another portion of the opinion, and the court based its
twenty percent calculation on the $58,892.97 figure, resulting in reasonable value to plaintiff
of $11,778.59. The district court correctly stated the trial court's finding at $11,778.59, but
stated the total fee as $56,892.97. Thus the basis of the reasonable value calculation is not
dear from the district court's opinion. See Hill v. Douglass, 248 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1971).
33. The rule against utilization of a contingent fee as a measure of reasonable value has
been applied where a contract between plaintiff and defendant provided that in case of suit,
defendant would pay plaintiff's attorney's fees, Ronlee, Inc. v. P. M. Walker Co., 129 So.2d
175 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961) ; and where an insurer was obligated by statute to pay a reasonable
sum for plaintiff's attorney's fees if judgment were rendered against the insurer and in favor
of plaintiff, Travelers Insurance Co. v. Davis, 411 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Allstate Insurance Co. v. Chastain, 251 So.2d 354 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971); Old Colony Insurance Co. v.
Bunts, 250 So.2d 291 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). The rationale for such decisions is that because
of the risk involved, a contingent fee is usually set higher than a flat fee. In addition, a
plaintiff would be inclined to be liberal in arranging a fee with his attorney if the defendant
were required to pay any fee which was arranged, regardless of its amount.
34. 155 So.2d 805 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
35. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1971).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

presumption that the contingent fee arrangement continued after the
attorney withdrew. It was presumed, although not decided, that his
compensation would be on a quantum meruit basis, based upon the rule
concerning discharge of an attorney by his client. 6
Security Trust is distinguishable from Hill v. Douglass on several
bases. In Security Trust the reason for withdrawal was not known,"T
and the presumption that compensation would be on a quantum meruit
basis was based upon the rule which applies when an attorney has been
discharged by his client. An implied agreement between the attorneys
that each would share in the fee was found to exist in Hill, but the existence of such an agreement was not mentioned in Security Trust.
Furthermore, the court in Security Trust did not decide, but only presumed, what the basis of compensation would be.
Although it may be argued that to base the reasonable value of
the testifying attorney's prior earned fee upon the contingent fee would
increase the risk that the attorney might perjure himself to enhance
his fee, the allowance of the fee on a quantum meruit basis would do
little to decrease this risk. Where the fee is on a contingency basis the
testifying attorney will recover nothing, regardless of how the reasonable value might otherwise be computed, unless his client is successful.
He cannot receive the full reasonable value of his services, however
measured, unless the total fee is large enough to cover both attorneys'
services. Consequently, perjury might be invited as readily to provide
a fund out of which a quantum meruit-based fee might be paid as to
increase his portion calculated as a percentage of a contingent fee.
Furthermore, as noted previously, the requirement that there be no bad
faith or coloring of testimony greatly alleviates the perjury problem.
The decision in Hill v. Douglass has terminated the trend which
had been developing in Florida Ethics Committee opinions toward extending the Code of Professional Responsibility to unreasonable lengths
in depriving the ethical attorney of due compensation earned for services rendered. The Supreme Court of Florida has impliedly given effect
to the obvious principle that "[t]he legal profession cannot remain a
viable force in fulfilling its role in our society unless its members receive
adequate compensation for services rendered . .

.,,

JUDITH HAYES
36. See Winn v. City of Cocoa, 75 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1954).

37. The principle to be applied in fixing the amount of the fee cannot be determined
unless the reason for and nature of discharge are known. Rosenkrantz v. Hall, 161 So.2d 673,
674-75 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).

38. EC 2-16.

